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Who’s Afraid of Determinism?
LESLIE STEVENSON
Abstract
Because of the idealizations involved in the ideas of a total state of theworld and of all
the laws of nature, the thesis of all-encompassing determinism is unverifiable. Our
everyday non-scientific talk of causation does not imply determinism; nor is it
needed for the Kantian argument for a general causal framework as a condition for
experience of an objective world. Determinism is at best a regulative ideal for
science, something to be approached but never reached.
1. The status of determinism
Determinism is standardly understood as the thesis that the laws of
nature together with the state of the world at any particular time
necessitate the state of the world that must come next. Since the
same applies to every future instant, the whole subsequent history
of the universe would be predetermined. In the early nineteenth
century the French mathematician Laplace expressed this metaphys-
ical claim in epistemological form: if a super-intelligence or demon
knew the total state of the universe at a given time and all the laws
of nature, then the demon (or these days, a super-computer) could
do the calculations and predict every state of theworld withmathemat-
ical certainty. (Legend has it that when the Emperor Napoleon asked
him where God came in, Laplace replied ‘Sire, I have no need of
that hypothesis’.) Indeterminism is the negation of determinism –
that there is at least one case in which the future is not necessitated
by the present.
Over the last few centuries it has seemed to many people intellec-
tually compulsory to believe in determinism, in light of the impressive
progress of science and our continuing commitment to scientific
method. Admittedly, the advent of quantum mechanics has shaken
belief in universal determinism at all levels of nature, but the
theory of chance events at the sub-atomic level has not done much
to stop a widespread fear that determinism may still apply at the
level of human behaviour. Yet the possibility cannot be ignored that
random micro-events may result in some degree of indeterminism at
the macro-level, as illustrated by the notorious thought-experiment
431
doi:10.1017/S0031819113000867 © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2014
First published online 10 January 2014
Philosophy 89 2014
of Schrödinger’s cat, and (so I am told) by recent developments in
quantum computing and cryptography. And there is a long-
standing argument that even if there should be some indeterminism
in the brain, that would not amount to free will, which surely involves
some connection (which need not however be determination) between a
person’s decisions and the reasons for them in her thoughts, desires
and feelings. A ‘choice’ that is determined by a sub-atomic chance
event hardly seems like a choice at all. Indeterminism might be a
necessary condition of free will (though that has long been denied by
compatibilists), but it is certainly not a sufficient condition. Thus
philosophers have continued to debate the implications for free will
if determinism is true, and to exercise their conceptual ingenuity on
a variety of subtle positions about the compatibility or incompatibility
of free will with determinism. This debate is predicated on a wide-
spread assumption that determinism is a coherently-statable, extre-
mely general, yet ultimately empirical claim about the overall
character of our universe – and that science has provided strong evi-
dence for its truth at any level above the atomic.
However I am going to argue that there are several fundamental
difficulties in this apparently easily-stated but ambitiously world-
encompassing conception. Even before we get to physical science,
there is a purely mathematical obstacle in the way of a Laplacean
demon or computer. Most of us, knowing little science (perhaps
only the school textbook statements of Newton’s laws of motion)
tend to assume that the calculations can be straightforwardly per-
formed. But that is to betray ignorance of the complexity of the math-
ematics that is involved. Even in the long-standing paradigm case of
gravitation, whose mathematics is elementary by today’s standards,
there lies a problem. Newton’s Second Law ofMotion says that accel-
eration of a body, i.e. the double derivative of distance with respect to
time, is equal to the force acting on it divided by its mass. So to know
its velocity at any time we have to integrate the differential equation;
and to predict its position we have to integrate again. If there were
only two bodies in the universe, then given their masses and their
relative distance we can readily calculate the gravitational force
acting between them and thus their acceleration towards each other,
and hence their velocities and positions at subsequent times after
their initial positions and motions. If however we imagine three
masses isolated from all other forces, the derivation of predictions
about their relative motions and positions poses the classic ‘three
body problem’ that is apparently still unsolved in principle, though
there are methods of making approximate predictions for practical
purposes (so that we were able to send men to the moon and back).
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The moral of the story is that even in that very simple artificially iso-
lated case, although we believe that the future states of the system are
completely determined by the laws and its initial state, neither our
best mathematicians nor our most powerful computers can derive
predictions with absolute precision.
Recent developments in the mathematics of so-called ‘chaotic’ or
nonlinear systems show that for some equations the predictions that
can be computed from initial states can vary dramatically, depending
on very small differences in the initial states (as in the ‘butterfly-wing
effect’ on the weather on the other side of the world). ‘Chaotic’ is not
really the best label for these systems, for the output values remain
mathematically determined by the input values, it is just that tiny
differences in the inputs can make huge differences to the outputs.
This means that in practice, given that all of our actual measurements
have limits of accuracy, some of our predictions are liable to large
errors for complex systems such as the worldwide weather, and that
most complex system in the universe, the human brain. But the
point is also instantiated in simpler systems that we use to generate
‘random’ outcomes, such as tossing a coin, or dropping a ball to
bounce down through an array of pins, or the more elaborate rando-
mizing devices now used in national lotteries; in these cases, a human
action starts a physical process whose result cannot be predicted. It is
not just that we lack the technology to make sufficiently precise
measurements of the relevant variables, those systems are designed
to have so much multiplication of tiny differences that no measure-
ment could ever make realistic predictions of outcomes. We here
get indeterminateness arising from the limits of measurement, even
where Newtonian mechanics is assumed to apply.1
That is the first difficulty in the Laplacean picture. Next I want to
point out how much idealization is involved in the notion of the total
state of the universe at any one time. There is no prospect of anyone (or
any computer) ever knowing such a total state of this world, including
the size and shape and fall of every leaf, the motion of every molecule
in the air, the exact mixing of genes in every act of reproduction, the
firing of every neurone in animal and human brains – let alone what
happens on other planets and in the nuclear innards of billions of
1 As Elizabeth Anscombe noted in her inaugural lecture ‘Causality and
Determination’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), reprinted
in E. Sosa (ed.) Causality and Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1975). The point has also been made by the distinguished mathema-
tician Roger Penrose, in The Emperor’s New Mind (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 224–5, 559.
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stars. Some philosophers are not impressed by mere epistemological
difficulty however, and will insist that this does not disprove the
metaphysical thesis that there exists a total state of the universe at
each moment.2
Peter van Inwagen has provided one of the most careful formu-
lations of metaphysical determinism.3 He expresses it in terms of
propositions, which makes it sound language-relative, but prop-
ositions as he defines them correspond to ‘possible ways the word
could be’, and those ‘ways’ can outrun what can be expressed in
any particular natural language. Thus his definition of determinism
has as its first clause: ‘For every instant of time, there is a proposition
that expresses the state of the world at that instant’. Some philosophi-
cal hearts (including mine) will quail at the thought of a monstrously
large proposition that expresses every instantaneous detail of the
entire universe, but metaphysicians are made of stronger stuff and
remain confident that their armchair formulations can encompass
the whole of reality. It does not help if we try to think an enormous
(perhaps infinite) number of propositions, each of which corresponds
to a way that some determinate part of the world can be; for the
conjunction of any set of propositions is itself a proposition, so if
you are prepared to recognize some such complete set of smaller prop-
ositions, you can get the One great World-encompassing Proposition
for free. The underlying intuition is robustly, indeed extremely,
Realist: namely, that at any time there is such a thing – or fact, or
state of affairs, or truth – as the way the whole world is, including
every detail of everything. And theMetaphysical or Ontological defi-
nition of determinism is that, given the Laws of Nature, each com-
plete instantaneous state of the world determines the state of the
world at any other time (or at least, at any future time).4
However I am going to argue that universal determinism is not an
empirical thesis at all, but rather an idea or ideal in Kant’s sense. In
support, I cite Nancy Cartwright (who knows vastly more science
and philosophy of science than I ever will) who describes universal
2 See JohnEarman,APrimer of Determinism (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986),
II.3–4.
3 Peter van Inwagen,An Essay on FreeWill (Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press, 1983) Ch.3, reprinted in Free Will, 2nd edition, ed. Gary Watson
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
4 At first sight it seems possible that the same total world-state could
come about from two different preceding states – but I do not need to
decide that question here. Earman offers an equivalent definition in terms
of time-slices of all physically possible worlds, i.e. possible worlds that
satisfy the laws of nature that hold in our actual world, op. cit. note 2, II.6.
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determinism as a ‘pseudo-rationalist idea’,5 and Robert Bishop, who
says ‘our best physical theories are terribly ambiguous regarding the
status of physical determinism’.6 But note that I am not taking the
logical positivist hard line that the idea of determinism is cognitively
meaningless – for it is an idea that we quite easily form and under-
stand – but rather that we arrive at it by a process of abstraction or
idealisation from the empirical realities that we actually deal with.7
It can never be directly applicable to them, though it can serve as
an ideal to be approached but never actually reached. As we have
seen, the definition of determinism requires the conception of a
total state-description of the universe at any one time. That contains
two idealizations – to the ideal of describing all the states, and of de-
scribing each particular state exactly as it is. And there is a third ideal-
ization, to the idea of a complete set of laws of nature.
Let me first address the ideal of exact description. This surely
implies measurement, for although there are plenty of everyday de-
scriptions which do not involve numbers (e.g. ‘purple’, ‘noisy’,
‘fragrant, ‘annoying’, ‘celebrity’, ‘sexy’), most serious science in-
volves assigning numerical values to empirical quantities, using
instruments of various degrees of sophistication, from rulers and
thermometers up to the likes of electron microscopes and Geiger
counters. But how precise can measurement be? Technology is con-
stantly improving, we are constantly told, but even the most skilled
operator of the most up-to-date piece of kit has to admit, if pressed,
that her observations are accurate only within a certain margin of
error. The realist metaphysician may say in his lofty way that this is
only a matter of gross human senses and gadgets, and that there
remains a distinction between physical reality and our approximate
measurements of it. His claim would presumably be that there is in
principle an absolutely precise answer for every question of measure-
ment, and he will have to allow that the numerical values will typi-
cally go into decimal points. But how far into that infinite range?
There is no theoretical limit, so the conceivable answers stretch into
the rational numbers, and perhaps the reals.
Realist-minded philosophers may still want to say that these prac-
tical limits on our knowledge of the present and predictions of the
5 Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), 6.
6 Robert Bishop, Chapter 4 of The Oxford Handbook of Free will, 2nd
edition, ed. Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 94.
7 See the index references to abstraction and idealization in Cartwright,
How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
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future do not affect the underlying facts about how reality is ‘in itself’.
Some may say that for all we know, the world may be completely de-
terminate in all respects; others may stoutly maintain that it must be
so. On the other hand,Michael Dummett (who developed the notion
of ‘anti-realism’) has described the assumption that every measurable
quantity must have a precise value given by a real number as ‘a realist
fantasy which, though deeply embedded in our thinking, must be re-
jected’.8 If so, it is a nice irony that realism, which is supposed to be in
the business of acknowledging reality as it is, may become fantastic,
i.e. out of touch with reality.9 But there are at least two kinds of dis-
sociation between thought and reality: we may underestimate what
there is, or wemay overestimate it. (The thesis that a certain ‘transcen-
dental’ kind of realism involves deep philosophical error is central to
the thought of Kant, but we have yet to see if that has any relevance to
our topic.) Dummett is bold enough to suggest that reality itself may
be in certain respects indeterminate – and he was not thinking of cau-
sally undetermined events, but of intelligible questions to which
there is no true or false answer.
I do not know anyway of resolving this standoff between realist and
anti-realist over exact measurement. The realist claim can hardly be
classed as meaningless, for it seems intelligible (and philosophers’ at-
tempts to draw sharp limits around the meaningful do not have a
promising track-record). The anti-realist will point out that the rea-
list’s claim can never be confirmed or disconfirmed by experience,
but the realist will not be fazed by that, for it was part of his view
from the start that the truth on some matters may forever outrun em-
pirical test. Perhaps the best the anti-realist can do is to show that the
idea of absolutely precise measurement plays no essential role in our
actual dealing with the world, not even in the most theoretical parts
of science. To be sure, science expresses laws in the form of math-
ematical formulas, and computations can be performed in idealized
cases (in textbook examples and school homework) by feeding
numbers into the equations. But when it comes to testing the empiri-
cal validity of those laws or using them to predict anything, we have to
use actually measured values of gross physical stuff, and these can only
8 Michael Dummett, Thought and Reality (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 87. (What a capacious title for a slim volume!)
9 I am reminded of the Northern Irish story about a university student
of engineering who got talking to the men digging up the road outside his
department; when he remarked that in his work he had to be accurate to
within the thousandth part of an inch, the fellow at the bottom of the hole
replied: ‘Youse is lucky! In our work we’ve gotta be dead on!’
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be accurate only within a margin of error, and should not be strictly
identified with numbers as abstractly conceived of.
It is tempting to suggest that the idea of exact measurement func-
tions as a Kantian ideal, to be approximated to but never actually
reached. But even that is open to question, for although it sounds
like good advice to say that we should make our measurements as
accurate as possible, our standards of precision will quite reasonably
vary depending on what we are measuring and for what purpose:
there will be no point in trying to measure the width of a road or
the height of a growing child to hundredths of a centimetre. And
even when it is important to micro-measure with the best available
kit, in cosmology or atomic theory for example, new technology
may increase our accuracy but we never get any nearer to coming
up with an infinite row of decimals, for the distinguishing feature
of an infinite set is that however many members of it you go
through, there always remain infinitely many more. Thus the math-
ematical ideal of complete precision is not asymptotically ap-
proached, but constantly recedes over the horizon.
Let me now come back to the idea of a total state-description of the
world at a time. The claimwould be that there always is amonstrously
large (yet presumably still finite) proposition, consisting of a con-
junction of all the true propositions about the world at a time.
Such propositions must outrun the conceptual resources of any
human language. There were electrons and stars in the universe,
and rocks and dinosaurs on the earth, long before humans developed
concepts of them. And we have to allow that the sciences will prob-
ably develop new concepts in future, to identify aspects of reality
that presently lie beyond our ken but are all around us now.
Conceptual innovation is not confined to the sciences, either: con-
sider the concepts of bassoon, A minor scale, symphony, cobalt
blue, golden section, pointillism, cubism, tragedy, sonnet, novel,
general election, prime minister, fascism, insurance contract, sub-
prime mortgage, paedophilia, and soap opera. Each of these concepts
has developed at some stage of human history, and if our history con-
tinues there will no doubt be new concepts, of which of course I
cannot yet give examples. I submit that the notion of a stupendously
large proposition conjoining all the truths about everything, invol-
ving all the concepts that are not just actual but possible, is a very
great idealization indeed.
It may be suggested that we can cut down the imagined superset of
all facts to a more manageable size by saying that the state-descrip-
tions in any realistic thesis of determinism will have to prescind
from any such riot of aesthetic, political and sociological concepts,
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and should be expressed austerely in terms of basic physical terms
that apply universally to the matter and energy of which everything
is composed. This raises a cluster of profound issues centring
round reductionism and emergence, about which clouds of technical
philosophy continue to be generated. Here I can only gesture to what
seem to be the main issues. There is firstly a question whether we can
ever be sure that we have identified the most basic level of physical
reality, for the history of science show a series of steps down the
levels, and though the much-hunted Higgs boson now seems to be
making its presence felt in the large hadron collider, there can
be no guarantee that our present Standard Model of sub-atomic
physics is the end of the story.
Then there are deep and difficult questions about how the pre-
sumed basic level relates to the other levels of reality, from the chemi-
cal and the biological up to the psychological, social, historical,
political, aesthetic – and whatever else goes into the untidy mix. If
we accept theweakest possible form ofmaterialism and say that every-
thing is composed of the entities recognized by the basic level of
physics, that excludes Platonic or Cartesian dualism of mind and
matter, but leaves almost everything else open. Most of us find
very plausible the weakest form of supervenience – namely that if
there is any sort of difference between two things or events, there
must be some difference between them at the basic material level,
or conversely that if they are exactly similar at the bottom level they
must be similar at all other levels of description. But this amounts
to very little: all it implies, for example, is that if orchestra A give
an exciting performance of Beethoven’s 5th Symphony whereas or-
chestra B’s account is underwhelming, there must be some difference
at the acoustic level between those two sound-events –which is hardly
news. If we imagine two possible states of thewhole universe identical
in every physical respect, then if we believe in supervenience we
would have to say that there could not be any difference between
them in any other respect. Yet it would not follow that their non-
physical properties can be deduced from a complete description at
the physical level, any more than the properties of a computer –
such as storing philosophical insights, subversive politics or child
pornography – could be deduced from a complete knowledge of the
electronics of its innards.
When physicists and cosmologists talk with their sublime arro-
gance of ‘a Theory of Everything’, I make bold to suggest that they
do not literally mean what they say. It is not part of the ambition of
physics to explain why Mozart’s early Quintet for Piano and Wind
is such a great work, why there were economic recessions after 1929
438
Leslie Stevenson
and 2007, or why Edward VIII decided to abdicate the British
throne. Physical theories are not about such humanly interesting
stuff, but about boring measurable quantities of mass, length, time,
charge, and radiation. And even in the realm of such physical facts,
there are still deep problems in the notion of a Theory of
Everything. A scientific theory, as Stephen Hawking himself
admits,10 is a humanly-constructed model which exists only in our
minds, but tries to economically explain a large class of past obser-
vations in terms of a small number of assumptions and to accurately
predict future observation. Up till now, all physical theories have
been partial, they have only tried to explain a large but limited class
of physical phenomena. Moreover, the computing of the observa-
tional implications of a physical theory involves approximations
and simplifying assumptions, as does the setting up of experimental
apparatus, as Hawking concedes11 and Cartwright documents in
detail.12 Adjudicating the fit or lack of fit between a theory and
reality is a messy business, both conceptually and technologically.
So there seems to be no real prospect of a theory that is complete
rather than partial, and fits observations exactly rather than
approximately.
This is connected with the third idealization I identified, to the set
of all the laws of nature. First of all, some epistemological modesty is
again appropriate. Can we derive all the higher-level laws, for
example that all men are mortal, that it hardly ever rains in the
deserts of Peru, or that sugar dissolves in water, from a certain set
of fundamental, basic-level laws – which these days would be at the
sub-atomic quantum level? If ‘derive’ means ‘mathematically
deduce’, that is an enormous task that so far as I know is in most
cases nowhere near completed. Indeed it is often difficult to know
where to start, because contingent empirical assumptions have to
be brought in, for example about the ocean currents in the Pacific
Ocean, and which such assumptions are we to make in each case?
Moreover, can we ever be sure that even our best-confirmed scientific
theory has identified all the fundamental laws of nature? Nancy
Cartwright has vigorously argued that what we like to think of as
the fundamental exceptionless laws of nature formulated by theoreti-
cal physics are not even literally true of the physical world, but are
10 Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (London: Bantam Press,
1998), 11.
11 Hawking, op. cit. note 11, 187, 204.
12 Cartwright,How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1983), Chapters 1 and 6.
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mere mathematical equations that can only be applied in imagined
textbook examples where all interfering factors are imagined away
by fiat, or in highly contrived experimental set-ups (‘nomological
machines’) where all known interfering factors are shielded off or
compensated for.13
Whether we like it or not, the universe seems to be irreducibly
complex, and resistant to exact and complete capture in any one
theory, even in our most prestigious and all-encompassing science.
Nancy Cartwright’s favourite phrase for it is ‘the dappled world’ (in-
spired by a famous poem ofGerardManleyHopkins). The notions of
a total state-description of the world and all the laws of nature are
idealizations vastly inflated from anything we will ever have reason
to believe in. This whole discussion confirms the theologian Austin
Farrer’s judgment back in the 1950s that determinism is not a
hypothesis but ‘a pious hope’ that under ideal conditions the complete
causes of all human conduct could be ‘plotted out’.14 It is indeed an
unverifiable faith.
2. Concepts of causation
So far I have not explicitly invoked the notion of cause. But determin-
ism has often been expressed as the claim that every event has a cause,
where a cause is usually understood as a preceding state of affairs
upon which the event follows in accordance with a law or rule,
hence with a certain kind of necessity. So let us scrutinize this well-
worn saying ‘every event has a cause’. It has often been taken in a de-
terminist sense, to mean that for any event there is a preceding total
state of the world which, given the laws of nature, implies that that
event must happen. But there is a much weaker way of interpreting
it. Take the example of an apple (that paradigm fruit of Newtonian
Paradise!) and consider how it could be detached from its tree by at
least three different kinds of cause – a gust of wind, the decay of the
last strand of its stalk, or the tweak of a human hand. It is one thing to
say that any particular apple-detachment must have some cause or
other in the vicinity, where by ‘cause’ we just mean an event of a
kind which normally results in an effect of the relevant type; but it
is quite another thing to assert that for every apple-detachment
there must have been some preceding total state of the universe
13 Op. cit. note 12, Chapters 2 and 3.




which made it inevitable. That is a speculative thesis that goes way
beyond the homely generalizations of apple-gathering folk.
The usual generalization ‘Every event has a cause’ may seem very
simple, but it is deceptively so, for it suffers from ambiguities in the
notion of cause and the associated notions of law, rule, and neces-
sity.15 There is an everyday usage of the word ‘cause’ which
amounts to what made a certain event happen in the circumstances,
and what is usually meant is themost distinctive thing in that set of cir-
cumstances that made or allowed the event to happen, where what
counts as ‘most distinctive’ often depends on our interests in appor-
tioning praise or blame, e.g. was the plane crash caused by pilot error,
extreme weather, or a design-fault in the aircraft? But this informal
notion of what made something happen in the circumstances by no
means implies that it absolutely had to happen, that nothing whatso-
ever could have stopped it. The possible causes of apple-detachment
mentioned above could each be prevented from having their usual
effect: the pressure of the wind could be stopped by a wind-shield,
the decay of the stalk might be arrested by a chemical spray, and
the apple-picker’s grasp might be interrupted by something more
urgent diverting her attention (the voice of Adam, perhaps?). In
the case of the air disaster, the absence of any one of the above-
mentioned factors might have been enough to avoid a crash. It is
harder to see how it could have been prevented if all three factors
combine, but it is not inconceivable, for perhaps another freak in
the weather might allow a skilled pilot to stabilize the falling plane.16
I am thus backing up Elizabeth Anscombe’s ground-breaking ar-
gument that our ordinary notion of causality does not imply determi-
nation or necessitation.17 It seems to involve only the conception of
what usually leads to the effect, if no interfering factor prevents it,
where the vagueness of the word ‘usually’ matches the vagueness of
our everyday notion of ‘cause’. Perhaps even ‘usually’ is too strong,
in the light of cases such as the well-known fact that people
15 See Earman, op. cit. note 2, II.2, and Cartwright op. cit. note 5,
5.2.5.
16 My informal examples receive support, I think, from Cartwright’s
discussion of the problems involved in the composition of causes in op.
cit. note 12, Introduction and Essay 3; see also Robert Bishop’s discussion
of the failure of causal closure in physics in Chapters 4 and 5 of op. cit.
note 6.
17 Anscombe, op. cit. note 1. See also her paper ‘The Causation of
Action’, in C. Ginet (ed.) Knowledge and Mind (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983), reprinted in Human Life, Action and Ethics:
Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005), 103–4.
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sometimes, but not always, catch diseases when exposed to infection.
If A develops the symptoms of flu after being in a room full of
sneezes, we will say with great confidence that that was the cause of
A’s catching flu, even if we know that B was also there but did not
get it. Even if a majority of those sneezed upon do not develop flu,
we may still believe, not unreasonably, that for those who do catch
it their exposure was the cause. Similarly, we may be quite certain
that it was last night’s storm that brought down our beloved oak
tree, though previous storms of equal or greater ferocity did not.
And we may ascribe Joanna’s appreciation of the difference
between Kantian and utilitarian ethics to her taking course 101 in
Moral Philosophy, even if most of her less attentive class-mates fail
to come away with any such understanding. So if ‘usually’ is taken
to imply ‘in a majority of cases’, we will have to downgrade still
further to the bathetic ‘quite often’. No wonder that Bertrand
Russell once mischievously described the law of causality as ‘a relic
of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erro-
neously supposed to do no harm’.18
Readers may be itching to protest that the lamentable imprecision
ofmost of our talk of causes is due to our ignorance. Theywill say that
if we get to knowmore about the operations of viruses and the human
immune system, the strength of tree roots and their vulnerability to
the wind, the intelligence and industry of particular students and
perhaps even some detail of their brains, then we should be able to
come up with more precise analyses of the causal factors that are rel-
evant in each case, and thus make more confident explanations and
predictions. Now I do not for a moment deny that we can make pro-
gress in identifying more causal factors and in understanding how
they can affect outcomes; indeed, most of science consists of such in-
quiries. But I insist that many of the generalizations involved will still
need to hedge their bets, and take the form: if A, B and C occur, then
D will usually, or normally, or nearly always, happen (or: if A, B and
C occur, then D will happen unless something intervenes to prevent
it). For anything as complex as immune systems, human psychology,
and perhaps even the growth of trees, there seems to be no prospect of
achieving a complete and perfect understanding of all the factors in-
volved in their behaviour. So any summary of the state of the science
about such complex systems needs to acknowledge a fringe of ignor-
ance, andmake allowance for interfering factors that remain unknown
18 Bertrand Russell, ‘On the Notion of Cause’, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 1912–13, reprinted in his Mysticism and Logic
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917).
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or imperfectly understood. Scientific research increases our knowl-
edge, but does not reduce our ignorance to zero. Science is never
omniscience.
But though this point may be admitted for complex systems where
complete understanding and predictability are humanly impossible,
anyone who has learnt a bit of science may want to insist that at the
micro-level of chemistry and physics we have discovered fundamental
laws that are genuinely exceptionless, and need no hedging about
with untidy reference to possible interfering factors. Our paradigms
tend to remain Newton’s laws of motion, Maxwell’s equations for
electro-magnetism, and the formulas for chemical reactions –
though the need for catalysts may muddy the latter waters.
However there is an important distinction between the general the-
ories involving such laws and their application to real-life situations.
The examples in the textbooks invite us to consider simple situations
in isolation, as if nothing else existed in theworld – or nothing else that
is relevant, at least. Newton’s first law says that a body not acted upon
by any forces will continue in its state of rest or of motion in a straight
line, but of course there is no such totally isolated body anywhere in
the universe. Classical mechanics achieved striking success in ex-
plaining and predicting the motions of the solar system, and has
thereby exerted a stranglehold over our imaginations, leading many
people to assume that science has proved the truth of determinism.
But that success with the heavenly bodies rests on the contingent
facts that the sun is enormously massive compared to the planets,
that they themselves are much more massive than the asteroids and
comets, and that all the stuff in the rest of the universe is so distant
that its gravitational effects can be safely ignored. The impressively
accurate predictions of eclipses and comets for many years ahead
are based on approximations, which work to the scale of accuracy
that concerns us. But for smaller asteroids their motions cannot be
computed with similar long-term accuracy, so future impacts on
the earth can be neither predicted nor ruled out (except when it is
too late). The solar system looked at in detail is quite complex after
all, and not every smaller event is predictable. I conclude that there
is plenty of application for our rough-and-ready everyday concept
of causation, without commitment to determinism.
3. The need for a general causal framework
But is determinism a necessary condition of our having any con-
ception of an objective material world? Kant has often been
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interpreted as proving (or at least as taking himself to have proved)
just that, and it is true that some of his writing suggests as much.19
I do not want to get involved here in eternally-debated matters of
Kantian exegesis (his arguments in the Second Analogy seem
especially repetitive and ambiguous), so I will just offer a summary
view of what I think we should learn from what he had to say on
these topics of causality, determinism and objectivity. Like every
other 18th century thinker Kant was very strongly influenced by
the Newtonian paradigm, and he sometimes seems to commit
himself to the a priori truth of determinism, or at least to what we
have seen to be the vaguer claim that every event has a cause. But
unlike Hume, who treated the latter as an posteriori matter, Kant
argues for its synthetic a priori status as a necessary condition of
experience of an objective physical world. So his interpreters have
naturally tended to assume that he carried forward this result to his
statement of the free will problem in the opposing arguments of the
Third Antinomy, and to his proposed solution, one side of which
seems to be a clear affirmation of determinism as applying to the
whole empirical world, including ourselves as physical beings in
time.20
The headline of Kant’s Second Analogy encourages us to read him
as a determinist. In the first edition the thesis is: ‘Everything that
happens (begins to be) presupposes something which it follows in
accordance with a rule’ (A189), and in the second edition it is re-
worded as: ‘All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the
connection of cause and effect’ (B232). It is tempting to read these
sentences as asserting that every event has a cause, but we have seen
that that is an ambiguous statement. In the very repetitious argument
that follows, Kant makes central appeal to the fact that not every
alteration in our perceptual experience, e.g. in successively walking
around a large house, represents an alteration in the object perceived,
for a house does not normally change as one inspects it, so one pre-
sumes that its parts and features remain in simultaneous existence
as one moves around it. But in other cases our perceptions do rep-
resent changes in the objective world, such as when we see that a
19 See the Second Analogy of Experience, and the arguments for the
thesis and antithesis of the Third Antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason.
20 Henry Allison, doyen of Kant interpreters, has written: ‘the Kantian
project requires not merely the reconciliation of free agency with causal
determinism … but rather the reconciliation of such determinism with an
incompatibilist conception of freedom’, Kant’s Theory of Freedom
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 28.
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ship has changed its position. The main ‘transcendental’ topic of
inquiry in the Second Analogy is into the necessary condition of
our being able to make such distinctions between changes in our per-
ceptions and changes in the things we perceive.
But what exactly is this necessary condition thatKant claims to elu-
cidate? That remains rather embarrassingly vague and disputable.
Henry Allison says that it is ‘merely that every event falls under the
schema of causality rather than under particular causal laws’.21
That might get us stuck in another notorious morass of Kantian-
exegesis in the Schematism chapter, but perhaps we can steer
round that if we take up Allison’s other formulation, that Kant is con-
cerned only to defend the ‘every-event-some-cause’ principle, rather
than the ‘same-event-same-cause’ principle.22 Graham Bird suggests
we should understand Kant as arguing only that every event must be
contained within ‘a general causal network’.23 On this interpretation,
what the Second Analogy succeeds in showing is that our recognition
of perceptible events in the world as objectively ordered in time and
space requires that we locate all events within a web of spatial and
temporal relations that involve a great deal of causal connection.
The main idea is that to make the distinction between the time-
order of our perceptual experiences and the time-order of events in
the physical world we need to rely on the normal workings of our
sense-organs, i.e. the causal dependence of our perceptual experi-
ences on things perceived and on our spatio-temporal relationship
to them, plus the known regularities in the persistence and changes
of familiar sorts of thing. So we could not apply the concept of objec-
tive event unless (to put it vaguely) we also find plenty of application
for causal conceptions.
But that need not imply that every single event must have a cause.
Once a general causal framework is in place, can there not be concep-
tual room for some uncaused events? After all, the physicists now tell
us that quantum mechanics has shown that undetermined events
occur at the sub-atomic level, and there can be no hidden variables
to explain them. And at one stage in twentieth century cosmology,
before the advent of the Big Bang theory, it was suggested (by Fred
Hoyle) that the observed expansion of the universe might be
21 H.E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 2nd edition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 256.
22 H.E. Allison, Idealism and Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 80.
23 Graham Bird, The Revolutionary Kant (Chicago and La Salle: Open
Court, 2006), 19.2, 20.1, 27.1.
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explained by the random creation ex nihilo of hydrogen atoms in in-
terstellar space. That is not now believed, but the idea has, I take
it, been rejected on empirical rather than a priori grounds. In olden
times people believed that lower forms of life were spontaneously
generated in dust and slime, and though we now know they were
wrong, they surely had enough of a general causal framework to be
able to distinguish their perceptions from objects perceived, so they
satisfied the requirements of Kant’s Second Analogy whilst
perhaps believing that some events lacked causes. At present we
lack a thorough understanding of what causes the incidence of
cancer in individual people and its occasional remission (sometimes
greeted as miraculous). We all hope that medical science will make
progress on this, but if evidence were to emerge that the growth
and remission of tumours depends on random events at the
quantum level, the lack of causation for such cancers would not
impugn their tragic reality.
Much depends here on what wemean by that very ambiguous little
word ‘cause’. If we see any of the above possibilities of ‘uncaused’
events as not ruled out a priori, it is surely because in those scenarios
the relevant events are envisaged as fairly frequently, though unpre-
dictably, occurring in certain specifiable conditions. Any report of a
one-off uncaused event could reasonably be disputed on grounds
like those Hume adduced against believing any report of a miracle:
it would be said that the observer must have been mistaken, that
the recording apparatus was not working properly, and so on. But
if in a certain type of condition A, events of type B are quite often
reliably observed to happen, though in ways that we cannot explain
by any intervening factor C, then it seems we have a choice. We
could continue to insist that there must be some such explanatory
factors, however many times we have failed to find them, and thus
maintain that every event has a cause as a matter of unfalsifiable
faith. Or else, so my argument suggests, it is open to us to say that
these B-events have no causes in the sense of something that necessi-
tates their occurrence in the circumstances. Yet they could still be said
to have a cause in theweakest possible meaning of theword, namely, a
type of condition A in which Bs have been known to sometimes
occur, perhaps with a quantifiable measure of probability. That
usage would drop any connotation of A making Bs happen, but it
could retain the notion of A being the source of Bs, that from which
Bs typically derive, or in which Bs tend to come into being.
We would surely still believe that every event has an effect, or at
least that it could have an effect on suitably-placed observers or instru-
ments, but we would give up the belief that every single event has a
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cause in that sense of something involving a necessary connection
between cause and effect. Kant obviously had that stronger sense in
mind when he wrote: ‘For this concept [of cause] always requires
that something A be of such a kind that something else B follows
from it necessarily and in accordance with an absolutely universal
rule’ (A91/B124, with his emphasis), and: ‘there must therefore lie
in that which in general precedes an occurrence the condition for a
rule, in accordance with which this occurrence always and necessarily
follows’ (A193/B238-9, with my emphasis).24 Just after the first of
those sentences, Kant wrote that the concept of cause has a dignity
and necessity which an empiricist like Hume fails to accord it – so
perhaps he would accuse me of casting aspersions on its dignity! To
be sure, Hume found necessary connexion to be part of our idea of
cause, but the sort of necessity he offered was altogether too subjec-
tive and contingent for Kant. And although Hume talked of constant
conjunction as the foundation of our causal beliefs, in later sections25
he allowed that probable reasoning, which leads to uncertain con-
clusions, can be founded on chances (as in the fall of a die), and on
causes where past evidence contains contrary instances in which
similar states of affairs have produced different results. Hume thus re-
cognized a probabilistic conception of cause. Both philosophers talk
of regularity, and of things happening in accordance with a rule, but
both could avail themselves of the ordinary language point that
neither phrase need imply the total absence of exceptions, e.g.
‘Snoggins attends our church regularly – though not when he’s ill
or on holiday’; ‘As a rule, heavy smoking leads to lung cancer – but
for reasons that we do not understand, it does not always do so’.
Kant had a notoriously rigorist cast of mind, and his main concern
was to analyse the a priori elements in causation and the necessity of
causal connections as he understood them, but he knew perfectly
well that there is such a thing as probable empirical reasoning, so
he need not have cavilled at the idea of probabilistic causation.26
The upshot of this section is that although Kant may have thought
he had proved the need for scientific-style exceptionless laws as a pre-
requisite for experience of an objective world, it seems that all that he
succeeded in showing is that we need a general causal framework as
part of our conception of an objective physical world, and that
24 Quotations are from the English translation ofKant’sCritique of Pure
Reason by Guyer and Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998).
25 Treatise of Human Nature I.III.xi–xii.
26 A728-9/B756-7; A775/B803; A820-2/B848-50.
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within such a framework every event has a cause, if only in theweakest
possible sense of a probabilistic cause or typical originating
condition.
4. A regulative principle
As we have repeatedly seen, to say of any given event that it is prede-
termined is to say that it is necessitated by the laws of nature plus pre-
ceding total state-description of the world; and to say of an event that
it is undetermined is to say that the laws of nature plus the preceding
total state-description do not necessitate it. So both determinism and
indeterminism (Kant’s ‘transcendental freedom’) presuppose that
there is such a thing as a total description of the world at any given
time – but we have found that such a notion is an idealization way
beyond whatever progress we may make in science and technology.
Determinism and indeterminism are precisely what Kant called’
transcendental’ ideas or concepts:
Thus the pure concepts of reason we have just examined are
transcendental ideas. They are concepts of pure reason; for they
consider all experiential cognition as determined through an
absolute totality of conditions. They are not arbitrarily invented,
but given as problems by the nature of reason itself, and hence
they relate necessarily to the entire use of the understanding.
Finally, they are transcendental concepts, and exceed the
bounds of all experience, in which no object adequate to the
transcendental idea can occur. (A327/B383-4, with Kant’s
emphasis)
I suggest that determinism is an ideal that many scientific theories
quite reasonably try to live up to (though not it seems in quantum
mechanics, or arguably in individual psychology or in economics),
but it is not an empirical assertion, let alone a true one, about the
physical world as a whole. Consider how much of the surface of the
earth is littered with material stuff that is the intentional result of
human activity.27 The successes of much physical science have en-
couraged the speculation that the whole universe is deterministic,
but that will always remain beyond complete verification. This con-
clusion fits with the distinction between constitutive claims and
27 Anscombe wrote of ‘an itch for determinism’ in the human mind
(‘The Causality of Action’, op. cit. note 17). This consideration suggests
there are limits to how much we should scratch it.
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regulative principles that Kant made so much of in the Dialectic of
the Critique of Pure Reason. Here is a typical statement:
Thus the principle of reason is only a rule, prescribing a regress in
the series of conditions for given appearances, in which regress it
is never allowed to stop with an absolutely unconditioned. Thus
it is not a principle of the possibility of experience and of the
empirical cognition of objects of sense … nor is it a constitutive
principle of reason for extending the world of sense beyond all
possible experience; rather it is a principle of the greatest possible
continuation and extension of experience… thus it is a principle
of reason which, as a rule, postulates what should be effected by
us in the regress, but does not anticipate what is given in itself in
the object prior to any regress. Hence I call it a regulative principle
of reason … (A508-9/B536-7, with Kant’s emphasis)
At the end of his solution to the Third Antinomy, Kant says that he
has not been trying to establish the reality of freedom (by which he
meant transcendental freedom, i.e. indeterminism), and not even
its possibility; he rests his case on treating freedom as a transcendental
idea which does not conflict with natural causality (A558/B586). I
fear he was not so clear about the status of determinism; he seems
prone to overestimate what he has shown in the Second Analogy,
indeed in one place he suggests it is a conception of the understanding,
whereas it would be more consistent with the main lines of his
thought to say that whereas causality is a category of the understand-
ing, determinism is an idea of reason.28
So we can follow the regulative injunction to keep on researching
into the causes of things as far as we can, without having to believe
in determinism either as an a priori or an a posteriori truth about
the ultimate structure of the universe. So for the human issues that
concern us so deeply, our commitment to science need not threaten
free will in the way that so many people have feared. Determinism,
where is thy sting?29
28 Reason for Kant being the faculty of making inferences and seeking
explanations. In the third Critique, he explicitly recommended a regulative
interpretation of the maxim that ‘all production of material things and their
forms must be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanical laws’
(Critique of Judgment, Section 70, 5:386–8).
29 This article is a substantially revised version of the last essay ‘A
Kantian Defense of Free will’ in my book Inspirations from Kant
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 139–161.
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